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Abstract
The catchup and convergence of developing economies with the Western world is a major
experience in modern history. In this paper we explore the role played jointly by technological
imitation and trade liberalization in a North-South endogenous growth model. We prove that
a gradual trade liberalization between South and North will promote convergence at any level
of initial trade costs if the Southern economies are fully industrialized, their R&D potential is
relatively low and the elasticity of substitution among manufactures is high enough.
1 Introduction and Related Literature
Empirically the patterns of North-South trade show a division of world production where the North
keeps the production of new, unstandardized manufactures while relegating the South to making
standardized, older products at lower cost. The pioneering study of Vernon (1966) and the followup
literature on product cycles analysis shed a lot of light in understanding such patterns of trade and
technology transfer.
Krugman (1979) advanced a seminal exogenous growth model, describing the determinants of
international convergence as a function of the strength of innovation in the North and technological
imitation in the South. His work allowed Grossman and Helpman (1991, henceforth GH), Lai (1995)
or Chui et al. (2001) to endogenize the forces leading to such innovation and imitation rates. Over
time, the literature on endogenous product cycles has further extended GHs model. For instance,
Mondal (2008) undertook a local stability analysis of the steady states in GH. The realities of FDI
and world migration were incorporated as determinants of product cycles and technology transfer in
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Mondal and Gupta (2008). Importantly, both the original GH model and all its extensions assumed
that the economies were either autarkic or trade was perfectly free.
Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2006), Cristobal Campoamor (2009) and Gusta¤son and Segerstrom
(2010) showed that trade liberalization was potentially important for North-South convergence in a
product cycle setting. But these authors evaluated the e¤ect of a marginal rise in trade openness on
real convergence, once trade openness was almost complete to start with. In this paper we attempt to
ll this gap by generalizing the conditions for real-wage convergence, since we allow for any possible
initial level of trade openness. In particular, we prove that the convergence phenomenon arises if the
size and R&D productivity of the North is su¢ ciently large, relative to the South, and the elasticity
of substitution among manufactures is high enough.
2 Environment
2.1 Endowments
As in GH (1991), we consider two countries: North and South. The population of both countries is
exogenously given (being Ls for the South and Ln for the North). There are three productive factors:
labor, researchers and nancial capital. Labor is employed in manufacturing, whereas researchers
are employed in a competitive R&D sector.
Given the assumed Northern comparative advantage to innovate, researchers in the North are
used to conceive new varieties; researchers in the South can only replicate the existing ones to
produce them in the South at lower cost.
2.2 Preferences
Any representative household living in location k maximizes, in every period t, an intertemporal
utility function W kt such as
W kt =
Z 1
t
e (s t) log

Us
 
Xks

ds (1)
This function shows the discounted utility ow that the household k expects to obtain from period t
onwards by acquiring manufactures, grouped into the composite X. The composite of manufactures
Xs is a Dixit-Stiglitz subutility function over the aggregate mass of varieties invented up to period
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s.
Xs =
"Z n(s)
0
xj (s) dj
# 1

(2)
where 0 <  < 1 is a direct measure of the substitutability between varieties and xj (s) quanties the
household demand for variety j at time s. These preferences imply an appreciation of manufacturing
diversity, since utility grows as a given expenditure is more thinly split into an increasing number
of varieties.
2.3 Technologies
In the global economy there is a continuum of industrial varieties with measure n, and n = nn + ns
(the sum of the Northern and Southern masses of varieties). The degree of product variety expands
over time due to innovation. Moreover, an increase in the measure of manufactures enlarges the
stock of public knowledge and reduces future R&D costs. GHs local stocks of public knowledge are
equal to n in the North, since all patents were originally made up there, and ns in the South.
The production function for every particular manufacture is identical and very simple: one unit
of labor produces one unit of nal output. Prior to the production of any manufacture it is necessary
to incur a xed cost to invent or imitate the corresponding patent. By perfect competition and free
entry in the innovative and imitative activities, such a xed cost is at least equal to the market value
of the patent. This value decreases with the local stock of public knowledge as follows:
vs  aswsns ; with equality when _ns > 0
vn  anwnn ; with equality when _n > 0
(3)
where vs and vn denote the values of Southern and Northern patents, respectively. asns and
an
n stand
for the number of researchers needed to imitate a Northern patent in the South and to create a new
variety in the North. Our variables ws and wn denote the nominal wage in the South and the North,
respectively. Consequently, when both innovation and imitation are active we can conclude that
ws =
nsvs
as
; wn =
nvn
an
(4)
Southern researchers need to incur the previous xed cost in order to replicate a Northern patent,
while Northern researchers do it to invent one from scratch. On the other hand, we assume that
our parameter   1 introduces the classical iceberg notion of trade costs for manufactures: it is
necessary to buy  units of the good abroad to consume one unit at home.
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2.4 Static optimization
Productive rms must decide which price to quote in every period to maximize prots. On the
other hand, consumers in any location not only decide how much to save, which equity to buy and
which varieties to consume, but also choose their job: they become either manufacturing workers or
researchers.
The function W ks is intertemporally maximized with respect to its ultimate arguments (xj (s),
8j, 8s  t) at every period t, taking as given the expected temporal paths of vn (s), vs (s), n, ns,
pj (s) 8j 8s  t. This problem can be decomposed into two parts:
- The static allocation of a given per-household expenditure Ek (s) among all kind of manufac-
tures, which gives rise to a demand function for each of these commodities.
- The choice of an optimal path for Ek (s), given the possibility of saving and investing in equity
of Northern and Southern rms.
Let us denote by E the aggregate world expenditure and by En and Es the part spent by people
from the North and the South, respectively, which are endogenous variables. Considering that the
demand for any variety comes from both Northern and Southern consumers who face di¤erent c.i.f.
prices, we can derive the aggregate demand for any Northern (xn) and Southern manufacture (xs),
taking into account (1) and (2) as follows:
xn = p
 
n

En
nnp
1 
n + nsp
1 
s
+
Es
nnp
1 
n + nsp
1 
s

(5)
xs = p
 
s

En
nnp
1 
n + nsp
1 
s
+
Es
nnp
1 
n + nsp
1 
s

(6)
where  = 11  and  = 
1  (0    1) is a measure of trade openness in the global economy with
respect to manufactures.
Firms maximize prots at any period s taking into account a demand of the type (5) or (6) and
the simple production function described above. As a result, both utility and prot maximization
from expressions (2), (5) and (6) result in an unconstrained markup over marginal costs, common
for all manufacturing rms in location k: puk =
wk
 , for k =North, South.
2.5 Dynamic optimization under perfect mobility of nancial capital
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We have to deal now with the intertemporal allocation of expenditure and savings. Such allocation
serves two basic purposes: the distribution of consumption along the time horizon and the nancing
of new startups in the North and the South. During that process, the household needs to consider
that a share m = _nsnn of the Northern mass of varieties is copied by Southern imitators. The previous
owners of these rms will consequently lose part of their equity.
Under perfect international mobility of nancial capital, our dynamic optimization problem leads
to the following non arbitrage condition, to be satised period by period:
_E
E
=
_Es
Es
=
_En
En
=
n
vn
 m  + _vn
vn
=
s
vs
  + _vs
vs
(7)
In order to characterize below our dynamical system, we also need to follow the evolution of the
aggregate mass of manufactures in the South and in the global economy ( _nsns and
_n
n ), whose path
will be determined by the labor market clearing conditions in both countries:
Ls = as
_ns
ns
+ nsxs
Ln = an
_n
n
+ nnxn (8)
2.6 Our key endogenous variables
We are going to group our set of endogenous variables into three key ratios, which will be constant in
the steady state of our dynamical system. Let us dene now these three basic endogenous variables
(b; c and d):
b  E
wn
; c  E
ws
; d  ns
n
It will also be useful to dene the Southern relative wage as !  wswn = bc .
3 North-South convergence analysis of the wide gap case
The wide gap case is a situation in which the Southern rms can quote their unconstrained markup 
ws


in both markets. This happens because the Southern equilibrium wage is so low that any
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potential Northern competitor will never try to undercut the Southern rms. More specically, from
now on we will only consider the case in which
! < = =
   1

=

   1



1
 1 (9)
Lai (1995; 2008) argues that this is a reasonable assumption, given the international patterns of
income disparity between the West and less developed countries.
3.1 Derivation of our system of di¤erential equations
First of all, we are going to solve for the share of Northern expenditure EnE . That will help us obtain
the system of di¤erential equations in terms of our three endogenous variables and the parameters
of the model: Ln; Ls, an, as, ,  and .
As in Mondal (2008), we will use a trade balance condition in both countries. Such balance
implies that
En = nnpnxn and Es = nspsxs (10)
That is, the local value of production must be equal to the local value of expenditure in both
locations.
Let us now denote by q the following endogenous variable:
q  d
1  d!
1  =
d
1  d

b
c
1 
(11)
After plugging (11) into (5), considering (10) and rearranging, we are nally able to get that
En
E
=
1 + q
q2 + 2q + 1
and
Es
E
=
q ( + q)
q2 + 2q + 1
(12)
The dynamics of the system will be explored by solving for nvn ,
s
vs
, nnxn and nsxs in terms of
b, c and d. If we consider our expression (4) and use the labor market clearing conditions in (8),
from (7) and (12) it is possible to derive a 3x3 dynamical system of nonlinear di¤erential equations
as follows:
8>>><>>>:
_b
b =  (+ Lnan )  d1 d Lsas + d(1 d)(q2+2q+1) [b (1 + q) + c (   1) q ( + q)]
_c
c =  (+ Lsas ) +
cq(q+)
q2+2q+1
_d
d =

 Lnan + Lsas

+ ( 1)(q2+2q+1) [ cq ( + q) + b (1 + q)]
9>>>=>>>; (13)
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Obtaining this system paves the way to possible extensions of our work. In this paper we will
limit ourselves to some steady-state analysis; however, it is possible to explore the local and global
stability of the system. Another very interesting task would be evaluating the welfare implications
of trade liberalization for both the Northern and Southern representative consumers. That would
also require the analyisis of the transitional dynamics.
3.2 Convergence e¤ects of trade liberalization in steady state
It is already possible to solve for the steady state values of our three endogenous variables: b; c and
d. By setting the left-hand side of our three di¤erential equations equal to zero, it is straightforward
to come up with:
b = (
q2+2q+1)(Lsas +)
q(q+)
c = (
q2+2q+1)
(1+q)


 1
Ln
an
+  

1
 1

Ls
as

d =
Ln
an
+
Ls
as
+2   1 (Lsas  
Ln
an
)
(14)
Obtaining the ratio of ws over wn,
! =
b
c
= K
q (q + )
(1 + q)
(15)
where
K  Ln  
an
as
Ls +
 1
 an
 1


Ls+as
as
 (16)
As we can observe in (14), both nominal wages depend in steady state on the level of trade openness.
Nevertheless, the local shares of varieties are not a¤ected by any trade liberalization. The steady-
state growth rate would not su¤er any modication either. Notice that our comparative statics
exercise will gain in predictability if there exists a unique steady-state for the system under the wide
gap case. Such condition will be guaranteed by the following Lemma.
Lemma 1.There exists a unique steady state equilibrium in our North-South economy under
costly trade.
Proof. The right hand side of (15) is positive and strictly decreasing in !, going to zero as !
tends to innity and to innity as ! tends to zero. Therefore, the continuous and di¤erentiable
function G (!) = K q(q+)(1+q) has a unique xed point. That means the steady state equilibrium exists
and is also unique.
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We will introduce now an auxiliary lemma that will be useful to derive our Proposition 1 below.
Lemma 2. Let us consider the following equation, which denes an implicit function for q:
q

q+
1+q
 1
= d1 d K
1 . We claim that q > (<) 1 if and only if d1 d K
1  > (<)1.
Proof. See the Appendix.
We are already able to obtain our main results, spelled out in Propositions 1 and 2.
Proposition 1. The nominal relative wage of the South (!) will rise in response to higher trade
openness, if and only if 1
1 
1
 1 (
Ls
as
 Ln
an )
(Lnan +)
<

Ln  anas Ls+
 1
 an
 1
 (
Ls+as
as
)
 1
.
Such condition does not depend on the level of initial trade costs.
Proof. Let us now denote by !  d!d . Using the implicit function in (15) and our denition in
(11), it is possible to di¤erentiate and get that, over the steady state,
!
!
=
 
1  q2
 (1 + q) (q + ) +
 
1  2 (   1) q (17)
This last expression involves that higher trade openness will increase (decrease) the Southern relative
wage only if q is lower (higher) than one. Since the expressions (11) and (15) need to hold, we can
derive the following expression:
q

q + 
1 + q
 1
=
d
1  d
K1  (18)
We know from Lemma 2 that
q > (<) 1 if and only if
d
1  d
K1  > (<)1 (19)
By (16), (17) and our last condition in (19), we can conclude that our nominal, relative wage ! will
be increasing (decreasing) in  if and only if
1
1  (
Ls
as
 Lnan )
( 1)(Lnan +)
< (>)
24Ln   anasLs +  1 an
 1


Ls+as
as

35 1 (20)
But we should pay attention to the ratio of real wages as well, taking the local price indices into
account. The Southern and Northern price indices (Is and In) are given by the following well known
expressions:
Is =
 
nsp
1 
s + nnp
1 
n 
 1
1  ; In =
 
nsp
1 
s + nnp
1 
n
 1
1  (21)
We know that the local real wage is equivalent to the indirect utility. Therefore, after some simpli-
cations, we can see that
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Relative Southern real wage  !R = !In
Is
= !

q + 
1 + q
 1
 1
= Kq

q + 
1 + q
 
 1
(22)
Proposition 2. It is possible to check that !R will also be increasing in  if and only if q < 1.
That implies that our crucial condition (20) will be necessary and su¢ cient for real convergence as
well.
Proof. See the Appendix.
In expression (20) we can see that ! is more likely to be positive the higher is the innovative
potential in the North and the lower is the imitative capacity in the South. The R&D potential in
each block will be determined by the population employed in the research sector and the R&D costs.
That is true because, as the size and productivity of the R&D sector in the North increases, the
Northern share of world manufactures will grow and more world demand will be channeled to the
North. That will increase the demand for labor in the North and the aggregate Northern income.
Once trade openness rises, initially there would be an upward swing in the net exports of the
South, since the aggregate income of the North is higher and imports become more attractive in
both countries. In fact, all Southern and Northern consumers will increase their imports by the
same percentage.
However, the trade balance condition means that net exports are always equal to zero in both
countries and, therefore, local wages need to adjust in favor of the South. As we can observe in (20),
this is only possible if  is high enough. Otherwise the aggregate expenditure on imports would not
increase su¢ ciently.
For instance, such aggregate expenditure would remain completely unaltered if  = 1, which
would prevent convergence. That is true because the right hand side of (20) would be equal to one
and lower than the left hand side.
Here we have provided a condition for convergence valid for the whole possible range of trade
openness, and not only for the limiting case in which  ! 1 . An interesting task would be exploring
its robustness as well. For instance, we could try to see if either occupational choice or the existence
of a stagnant (agricultural) sector would make convergence depend on the initial level of trade costs.
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4 Conclusions
Some crucial historical events, like Chinas accession to the World Trade Organization, have brought
the international distribution of production to the forefront of economic analysis. Therefore, econo-
mists have devoted much attention to the analysis of the product cycle in the context of free trade,
exploring the e¤ects of new intellectual property rights or the incorporation of new countries to the
global economy. However, the technical di¢ culty of the problem often prevented the analysis of
product cycles with costly trade. Here we tried to o¤er a rst step in that direction by looking for
international convergence implications over the steady state. Our main contribution to such debate
is a novel, closed-form condition for convergence in response to freer trade, at any level of initial
trade openness.
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6 Appendix
Details on dynamic optimization under perfect mobility of nancial capital
Let us denote by n and s the operating prots of any Northern and Southern rm, respectively.
At every period ', a representative household from location k owns a mass nk (') and sk (') of
Southern rms, respectively. Moreover, fnk (') stands for the share of gross savings devoted to
buying Northern equity. We will explore now the properties of an interior equilibrium in which all
consumers nance new startups in both countries (i.e. 0 < fnk < 1).
Our control variables will be Ek (our households expenditure) and fnk, whereas the state vari-
ables are nk and sk. Then, the present value Hamiltonian faced at time t by any household for
the period ' can be specied as follows:
Hk (') = e
 (' t) logEk (')
+nk (')

(wk + nkn + sks   Ek) fnk (')
vn
 mnk

+sk (')

(wk + nkn + sks   Ek) (1  fnk ('))
vs

The rst order condition corresponding to an interior solution for fnk (0 < fnk < 1) is the following
one:
e (' t)
1
Ek (')
=
nk (')
vn (')
=
sk (')
vs (')
; 8' (23)
By di¤erentiating in (23) and using the rst order conditions with respect to the state variables, we
can conclude that
_E
E
=
_Es
Es
=
_En
En
=
n
vn
 m  + _vn
vn
=
s
vs
  + _vs
vs
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The last expression shows how the protability of Northern and Southern rms must satisfy a non
arbitrage condition period by period. That condition immediately makes both local expenditure
levels grow at the same rate. In turn, such an identical growth rate in local expenditures immediately
requires a permanent trade balance, since otherwise no country would repay their debt while spending
permanently as fast as the rest of the world.
Details on the derivation of our system of di¤erential equations
Northern and Southern expenditure shares
Taking into account the demand function for every Northern variety, after some algebraic trans-
formations we can obtain from (5) and (6) that
nnxn =
En
 
wn

  
wn

1 
+  d1 d
 
ws

1  + Es
 
wn

 

 
wn

1 
+ d1 d
 
ws

1  (24)
Let us now rearrange the last expression to get that
En
wn
= b
En
E
= nnxn =
(En=E)
 
wn
E
  
wn
E
1 
+  d1 d
 
ws
E
1  +  (Es=E)
 
wn
E
 

 
wn
E
1 
+ d1 d
 
ws
E
1 
and hence
En
E
=
En
E
1 + q
+
EsE
 + q
(25)
Similarly, we can derive that
Es
E
= 1  En
E
=
EnE
1 + q
+
Es
E
 + q
(26)
Using simultaneously our equations (25) and (26), we can nally conclude that
En
E
=
1 + q
q2 + 2q + 1
and
Es
E
=
q ( + q)
q2 + 2q + 1
Non-arbitrage conditions
Since all rms from both countries will be able to quote the unconstrained markup, per period
operating prots for any manufacturing rm in location k are
k =

1  


wkxk, for k = North, South. (27)
Therefore, we can develop the expression (7) by using (4), (7) and (27) as follows:
n
vn
=

1  
an

nxn =
1  
an (1  d)nnxn (28)
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And now, from (10), (28) and (12)
n
vn
=
1  
an (1  d)
E
wn

En
E

=
1
 (1  d)b

1 + q
q2 + 2q + 1

(29)
By the same token, from (10) and (12),
nsxs = 

E
ws

Es
E

= cas

q ( + q)
q2 + 2q + 1

;
nnxn = ban

1 + q
q2 + 2q + 1

And then we are ready to obtain that
m =
_ns
nn
=
_ns
ns
ns
nn
=

Ls
as
  nsxs
as

d
1  d =
d
1  d

Ls
as
  q ( + q)
(q2 + 2q + 1)
c

(30)
As a result, from (7), (29) and (30), we can derive the rst of our three di¤erential equations:
_b
b
=
_E
E
  _n
n
  _vn
vn
=
1
 (1  d)b

1 + q
q2 + 2q + 1

  d
1  d

Ls
as
  q ( + q)
(q2 + 2q + 1)
c

 
   Ln
an
+

   1


b

1 + q
q2 + 2q + 1

(31)
And nally,
_b
b
=    Ln
an
  d
1  d
Ls
as
+
d
(1  d) (q2 + 2q + 1) [b (1 + q) + c (   1) q ( + q)] (32)
It is possible to conduct a very similar analysis with respect to our second endogenous variable c,
which results in the following di¤erential equation:
_c
c
=
_E
E
  _ns
ns
  _vs
vs
=    Ls
as
+
cq (q + )
(q2 + 2q + 1)
(33)
Dealing with our labor market clearing conditions, we can also derive the last di¤erential equation
of our dynamical system:
_d
d
=
_ns
ns
  _n
n
=

 Ln
an
+
Ls
as

+
(   1)
(q2 + 2q + 1)
[ cq ( + q) + b (1 + q)] (34)
Proof of Lemma 2.
Assume that q < 1. We are going to prove that then, necessarily, d1 d K
1  < 1. It is straight-
forward to observe that

q+
1+q

is increasing in  when q < 1 . Therefore, the maximum value
that

q+
1+q

can take is one, which implies that our left-hand side is equal to q < 1 and hence the
equality above implies that d1 d K
1  < 1.
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Assume now that d1 d K
1  < 1. We are going to show that then, necessarily, q < 1. If q  1,
then our factor

q+
1+q

is decreasing in  and, therefore, the minimum value it can take is one. As
a result, our left hand side will be q  1 , which contradicts our initial equality. Therefore, our
conclusion is that q < 1 if and only if d1 d K
1  < 1.
We can proceed in an analogous way to prove the second inequality.
Proof of Proposition 2.
Our starting point is
!R = !
In
Is
= !

q + 
1 + q
 1
 1
= Kq

q + 
1 + q
 
 1
(35)
Let us rst di¤erentiate with respect to  the expression

q+
1+q

. If we denote by

q+
1+q


 d(
q+
1+q )
d ,
q+
1+q


q+
1+q
 = q  1  2+  1  q2
(1 + q) (q + )
(36)
Then, from (17), (35) and (36)
!R
!R
=
!
!
+
1
(   1)
(
q
 
1  2+  1  q2
(1 + q) (q + )
)
=
=
 
1  q2 q + 
(   1) (1 + q) (q + ) q

(37)
where
  (1 + q) (q + )  q
 
1  2
 (1 + q) (q + ) + q
 
1  2 > 0 (38)
Then, we can see from (37) and (38) that !R > 0 i¤ q < 1. In terms of the parameters, !R > 0 i¤
(20) holds.
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